2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

3-28-2012

James McKeever v. Township of Washington

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"James McKeever v. Township of Washington" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1246.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1246

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 11-1093
_____________
JAMES MCKEEVER,
Appellant
v.
TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON; MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF
THE TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON; MATTHEW LYONS
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(No. 0312-1:1-09-cv-01175)
District Judge: Hon. Robert B. Kugler
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Tuesday, November 15, 2011
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: March 28, 2012)
OPINION
McKEE, Chief Judge.
James McKeever appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
dismissing various claims that arose from his termination as his township’s Director of
Public Works. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I.
1

Because we write primarily for the parties, we will only set forth those facts that
are helpful to our discussion of the issues.
McKeever filed this suit against the Township of Washington, its mayor, and the
Township Council. He alleges, inter alia, that Mayor Matthew Lyons discriminated
against him on the basis of his political affiliation, and that Lyons declined to reappoint
him in retaliation for his 2001 lawsuit against the Township. McKeever claims both
actions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.1
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and this appeal
followed.2
II.
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2007). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
[making] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor,” Galli, 490 F.3d at 270 (citing
Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005)), the court may
grant summary judgment if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to

1

McKeever also asserted political discrimination and retaliation claims under Article One
of the New Jersey Constitution; however, the state law claims were not pursued on
appeal.
2
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear the
burden of proof at trial,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
III.
To make out a prima facie case of political patronage discrimination, a plaintiff
“must show that (1) [he] was employed at a public agency in a position that does not
require political affiliation, (2) [he] was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct,
and (3) this conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the government’s
employment decision.” Galli, 490 F.3d at 271. The third prong requires proof that the
employer knew of the plaintiff’s political affiliation and that the affiliation caused the
adverse action. Id. at 275 (citing Goodman v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 664
(3d Cir. 2002)). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the same employment action
would have been taken even in the absence of the protected activity.” Id.at 271 (quoting
Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[A]dverse employment actions taken against public employees merely to
make positions available for political supporters could amount to political
discrimination.” Id. at 273 (quoting Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 731 (3d Cir. 1987))
(internal quotations marks omitted).
The district court correctly concluded that McKeever had satisfied the first two
prongs of the test but the record did not support the conclusion that his political affiliation

3

was a substantial or motivating factor in Mayor Lyons’s decision not to reappoint him.3
McKeever argues that Lyons’s decision to appoint Nicholas Pileggiwas motivated by (1)
Nick Petroni’s sponsorship of Pileggi’s candidacy and (2) McKeever’s affiliation with
the Moriarty faction of the local Democratic Party. However, even if we assume
arguendo that Lyons knew of McKeever’s affiliation with the Moriarty faction, the
record would not support a finding that this affiliation was a substantial or motivating
factor in Lyons’s decision not to reappoint McKeever. In fact, Lyons stated in a sworn
affidavit that he selected Pileggi because of Pileggi’s business and financial experience,
and there is nothing in the record to rebut that.
The record indicates that Petroni, a major contributor to Lyons’s campaign,
informed Pileggi of an opening for the position of Business Administrator of Washington
Township and that Petroni, Pileggi, and Lyons met to discuss the possibility of Pileggi
being hired for that position.These facts alone do not demonstrate that Petroni induced
Lyons to hire Pileggi as Director of Public Works. There is no dispute that the Director
of Public Works position was not discussed at that meeting; only the position of Business
Administrator was discussed. Thus, even if a reasonable jury could arguably have
inferred that Petroni attempted to influence Lyons’s decision to hire Pileggi as Business
Administrator during the first meeting, no reasonable jury could infer that Petroni

3

McKeever contends that the district court applied the wrong standard in determining
whether he had established the third element of his prima facie case. This argument is
based on a misinterpretation of the district court’s opinion. The district court applied the
correct standard in determining causation.
4

influenced Lyons’s decision to appoint Pileggi as Director of Public Works.4That
conclusion is supported only by speculation. Thus, the district court did not err in holding
that McKeever failed to establish the third element of his prima facie case.
IV.
To make out a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, McKeever must show:
(1) that [he] engaged in a protected activity, (2) that defendants'
retaliatory action was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising his or her rights, and (3) that there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory
action. A defendant may defeat the claim of retaliation by showing
that it would have taken the same action even if the plaintiff had not
engaged in the protected activity.
Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations and footnote
omitted). To establish the third element, “a plaintiff usually must prove either (1) an
unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly
retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal
link.” Id. Failing that, “the plaintiff must show that from the evidence gleaned from the
record as a whole the trier of fact should infer causation.” Id. (quoting Farrell v. Planters
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)).
McKeever relies on a statement in Lyons’s deposition to support his assertion that
Lyons refused to reappoint him in retaliation for McKeever’s lawsuit against the
Township. However, as noted by the district court, McKeever misconstrued Lyons’s

4

Lyons and Pileggi met a second time to discuss the Director of Public Works position; however,
there is no dispute that Petroni was not present at that meeting.

5

testimony. Lyons stated that he opposed McKeever’sappointment in 2005 because he
was uncertain whether McKeever’s settlement agreement with the Township precluded
McKeever from attaining tenure status upon reappointment and not because McKeever
instituted suit against the Township. Lyons’s explanation is supported by the minutes of
the Township’s 2005 reorganization meeting. During that meeting, Township council
members, including then-councilman Lyons, voted on McKeever’s appointment. The
minutes indicate that McKeever’s tenure status was the focus of the discussion that
preceded the vote. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that McKeever failed
to establish a causal connection between his prior lawsuit and Lyons’s decision to not
reappoint him.
V.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
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